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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

----------- ------------------STATE OF UTAH, in the
interest of DOUGLAS REX
IZATT, a person under

Case No. 14576

eighteen years of age.

BRIEF OF SHELDON J. IZATT
NATURAL FATHER AND RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants, Ben and Janet Stowell, together with the
maternal grandmother of the child in question, Ina Hellstrom,
now deceased, petitioned the District Juvenile Court in and
for Salt Lake County, for a determination that the child in
question, Douglas Rex Izatt, was dependant or neglected under
the laws of the State of Utah, that the Juvenile Court assume jurisdiction over said child, remove the child from the
custody of his natural father, Respondent, Sheldon J, Izatt,
and award custody to Petitioners; said Petition was subsequently amended, with the approval of the Court, to include
a prayer for the termination of all parental rights of the
natural father, Respondent herein.

Petitioners, in their

statement of the nature of the case, refer to a Writ of Habeas
Corpus proceeding in the Third Judicial District Court in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah; however, Respondent
takes issue with the inclusion of that Habeas Corpus proceeding in this appeal as more fully set forth in his argument herein.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Juvenile Court made and entered its Order on the
1st day of December, 1975, dismissing with prejudice a
portion of Petitioners-Appellants' Petition; and on the 20th
day of April, 1976 entered its Order dismissing with prejudice the remainder of said Petition.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks aff irmance of the partial and
final orders of dismissal entered in the Juvenile Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Respondent does not controvert paragraph 1 of

Appellants' Statement of Facts but would add thereto that
the natural father, Respondent herein, was granted reasonable
rights of visitation in the divroce action referred to by
Appellant. (Tr. 236).
2,

Respondent does not controvert paragraph 2 of

Appellants' Statement of Facts but would add thereto that
on the 25th day of February, 1975, after the death of the
child's natural mother, Judith H. Izatt, Ina Hellstrom, one
of the original Petitioners and the mother of the Appellant,
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Janet Stowell, took possession of the child and refused to
deliver the child over to his natural father, Sheldon J.
Izatt, either for visitation or custody, (Tr. 237).

The

Petitioner-Appellants, upon acquiring possession of the
minor child, did file on the 28th day of February, 1975 a
Petition in the District Juvenile Court in and for Salt Lake
County, for adjudication of dependency and/or neglect and
award of custody.

On the basis of that Petition and without

hearing, Ina Hellstrom was granted temporary custody of the
minor child in question, Douglas Rex Izatt.
3.

(Tr. 239-242).

Respondent does not controvert the facts as set

forth in paragraph 3 of Appellants' Statement of Facts.
4.

Respondent does not controvert paragraph 4 of

Appellants' Statement of Facts.

Respondent would add to

said paragraph 4 to reflect the objections to the Petition
for the adjudication of dependency and/or neglect and award
of custody as filed by the natural father, (Tr. 236-238), to
wit:
(4) That as of the death of Judith H. Izatt, mother
of the child, on February 25, 1975, Sheldon J. Izatt
has the legal right to custody and control of his
child Douglas Rex Izatt; further, that on February
25 1975 Ina Hellstrom, one of the Petitioners herein,
did without legal right, take possession of the child,
and, did refuse to deliver said child over to his natural father, Sheldon J. Izatt, either for visitation
purposes or custody.
(5) With the exception of the alleged delinquency in
child support, the exact amount of which Sheldon J.
Izatt is not certain at this time, Sheldon J. Izatt
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I

denies the allegations inferring neglect contained
within the Petition on file herein, and affirmatively
alleges that the allegation contained within paragraph
5 of the Petition to the effect that he was living
with a woman to which he was not married, is libelous,
inflamatory and without basis of fact.
(6) That subsequent to the death of Judith H. Izatt,
he has remarried, is currently residing with his
spouse at 5645 South 4270 West, Salt Lake City, Utah,
and is ready, willing and able to provide a home for
his son, Douglas Rex Izatt.
5.

With respect to the facts as set forth in paragraph

5 of the Appellants' Statement of Facts, Respondent does not
dispute the same other than to take the position that the
Writ of Habeas Corpus referred to herein was not part of the
Juvenile Court action, dismissal of which Appellants' appeai '
but was filed by Respondent, Sheldon J. Izatt, in the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County in an
attempt to regain temporary custody of the minor child.
6.

Respondent does not controvert the facts as set

fort~

in paragraph 6 of Appellants' Statement of Facts.
7.

Respondent does not controvert the facts as set fortr

in paragraph 7 of Appellants' Statement of Facts.
8.

I

Respondent does not controvert the facts as set forth

in paragraph 8 of Appellants' Statement of Facts but the
quote cited by Appellants should be clarified by pointing out I
that the quote cited by Appellants was a comment by the
Court directed to arguments of counsel as to the affect of
the Order in the Habeas Corpus proceedings as set forth in
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paragraph 7 of Appellants' Statement of Facts and that after
argument by counsel the Court did make the statement;
''Well, as a number one item we had better litigate the
Petition. If there is no neglect shown on the part of
the father then it seems to me that I would dismiss this
Petition. Then maybe we had better wait until we get
the Order from the District Court, but we can respond
to that after we get the Petition out of the way".
(Tr. page 17 lines2-7).
9.

Respondent does not controvert the facts as set forth

in Appellants' paragraph 9 but would point out that the
transcript reflects an Order by the Court to allow visitation
by the natural father, Respondent herein, on a weekly basis
(Tr. 25), but does not reflect that visitation was in fact
allowed by Petitioners and Appellants.
10.

Respondent does not controvert the facts as set

forth in Appellants' paragraph 10.
11.

Respondent does not controvert the facts as set

forth in Appellants' paragraph 11.
12.

Respondent does not controvert the facts as set

forth in Appellants' paragraph 12 with the exception of
clarifying from the record the statements of the Court and
counsel for Respondent regarding the visitation by the maternal aunt and uncle as follows
Judge Larsen:

(Tr. 208):

" ••• I think the maternal relatives have
no rights to see the child. It might
be important that the child go to Disneyland but that would not be an issue in
this case.
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Mr. Schwabe:

13.

If I may speak, Your Honor, to the issue,
As I recall the Court suggested it. It
was my legal opinion of which I advised
my clients the duty (while the transcripts
show "the duty to", it should read that
due to) the obfiscatory tactics and the
antics and the spurious allegations made
by Petitioners and the now deceased grandmother, that it would be best for their
interests and the child's interests to retain (retain should read refuse) any visitation.

Regarding the facts as set forth in paragraph 13 cf

Appellants' Statement of Facts, Respondent does not contravert the same.
14.

Respondent does not controvert the facts as set

forth in paragraph 14 of Appellants' Statement of Facts but
would add the dialogue from the hearing as follows (Tr. 74):
Judge Larsen:

Mr. Goodwill, you have the burden of
going forward.

Mr. Goodwill:

We call Sheldon Izatt as our first witness.
Mr. Izatt is not here, Your Honor.

Mr. Schwobe:

Your Honor, it is my understanding that
the purpose of this hearing today was
for Mr. Goodwill to put on his case.

Mr. Goodwill:

He is a witness in my case.

Judge Larsen:

Did you subpoena him?

Mr. Goodwill:

No, but he is a party. Parties are
obligated to attend. The only one that
had an excuse was the wife, we had no
knowledge or notice that he wouldn't be
here.

Mr. Schwobe:

I talked with Mr. Goodwill the night befcr
last, Your Honor, and he made no desire
for Mr. Izatt to be here. Mr. Izatt has
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1

a job and I don't feel he needs this
emotiona~ upset.
It is our duty to put
on no evidence today.
Judge Larsen:

Do you want to be heard on this one?

Mr. Stead:

No.

Judge Larsen:

I don't know that he was required to be
here as long as he is represented by
counsel. Ordinarily the father is here,
but I suggest you go on to your next
witness and subpoena him.

Mr. Schwabe:

Mr. Izatt will certainly be here to
present his own defense. I had no
notice ---

Judge Larsen:

Well, I suppose if Mr. Goodwill wanted
him here as a witness he could subpoena
him and require him here at the main case.

Mr. Stead:

I know of no rule that would compel him
to be here.

Mr. Goodwill:

We will call Mrs. Sudbury. (Tr. 75).

15.

Respondent does not controvert the facts as set

forth in paragraph 15 of the Appellants' Statement of Facts
but would point out that said facts are more properly couched
as argument and will be responded to within Respondent's
argument.
16.

Respondent does not controvert the facts as set

forth in Appellants' paragraph 16 with the exception that
Petitioners' Amended Petition, insofar as

tho~

allegations

contained within paragraph 1 (a) through 1 (c) under Conduct
and (a) through (c) under Condition, was continued to the
15th day of December, 1975.

Appellants filed no timely appeal

from this Order dismissing with prejudice a portion of their
Amended Petition.
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17.

With regard to the facts as set forth in Appellants'

paragraph 17, Appellants do not correctly reflect the facts
concerning the April 15th hearing (Tr. 197-198).

Attorney for

Respondent had previously set a motion to dismiss the remaining portion of Appellants' Petition on the 12th day of April,
and the remainder of the trial had previously been set for

the 15th day of April; due to illness of Attorney for Petition<:
Appellants, the Motion to Dismiss was continued from the 12th
day of April to the 15th day of April and the trial previously
set on the 15th day of April was striken, counsel for Petitioners did not appear on the 15th day of April for the purpose of completing his case in chief but only on the motion
for dismissal by Respondent.

(Tr. 197-198), as follows:

Judge Larson:

Well, now, Mr. Goodwill, this date was
set for hearing two or three days ago
when you called up and asked to have
it continued.

Mr. Goodwill:

Because I was incapacitated your Honor.

Judge Larson:

And you were advised it would be considered today. I don't know who told
you you couldn't put on any evidence.
You were told that you couldn't . . .
that the court wouldn't consider at
this time the main case, I would guess.

Mr. Goodwill:

We were told that it was set for trial
today, your Honor, we were told that
the trial date was stricken. The only
matter I couldn't speak with your Honor
I asked and I was told that I would not
be able to and I was told that it was
striken from the trial calendar and that
the only motion would be Mr. Schwobe's
motion to dismiss.
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18.

Regarding the facts set forth by Petitioners in

paragraph 18 Respondent does not controvert the facts set
forth therein; however, in that the facts are presented in
argumentative style they will be responded to in argument as
opposed to in the Statement of Facts.
A R G U ME N T
POINT I
THE ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL OF PETITIONERS' AMENDED
PETITION DATED DECEMBER 1, 1975 WAS A FINAL ORDER FROM WHICH
APPEAL WAS NOT TIMELY TAKEN.
On the 17th day of October, 1975, Petitioners' Amended
Petition came on for hearing for the purpose of Petitioners
presenting their case, with Respondent, the natural father,
Sheldon J. Izatt to present his case at a later time when the
Court had time available to hear the same.

At the end of the

hearing on October 17th, counsel for Respondent made a motion
to dismiss Petitioners' Amended Petition, which motion, after
argument, was taken under advisement by the Court (Tr. 176-181),
and was subsequently granted in part on the 1st day of December, 1975.

(Tr. 218-219).

The Court in its Order of Dis-

missal on December 1st, 1975 did dismiss with prejudice that
portion of Petitioners' Amended Petition contained within
paragraphs 1 (a) through 1 (c).

Those portions dismissed

with prejudice read as follows, (Tr. 223):
1
That Sheldon J. Izatt is unfit and/or incompetent
by reasons of conduct or condition seriously detrimental to the child as follows:
0
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CONDUCT
(a) The father has neglected and/or abused
the child physically on more than one occasion
(b) The father's conduct is both amoral and ·
asocial.
(c) The father has set an example of prevarication, immorality and vulgarity, which is seriously detrimental to the welfare of the child.
Section 55-10-112 (U.C.A. 1953, as amended), states in
part:
"
an appeal to the Supreme Court may be taken from
any order, decree or judgment in the Juvenile Court.
Such appeal should be taken in the same manner as which
appeals are taken from judgments or decrees in District
Court. The appeal must be taken within one (1) month
from the entry of the order, decree or judgment appealed from".
The Notice of Appeal filed in this matter by Petitioners
(Tr. 215), was not in fact filed until the 29th day of April,
1976, and then only applied to the Order of Dismissal entered
the 1st day of December, 1975, and was a final order dismissing with prejudice a substantial portion of Petitioners'
Amended Petition.

The postition of Respondent is that it

is improper at this time for Petitioners to request that this
Honorable Court reverse the Lower Court and its Order of
Partial Dismissal entered the 1st day of December, 1975 for
the reasons that there has never been a filing of a Notice
of Appeal from that Order or a preservation of a right to
appeal on the Order until a final determination of other
claims as provided for in Rule 72 (a), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Therefore, the Courts' Order of

Dece~ber

1975 should be affirmed.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10-

1st,

In addition to the foregoing the Court was well within
the discretion accorded to it by Section 55-10-84 (U.C.A.
1953, as amended), which provides"the Court may dismiss
a petition at any stage of the proceedings,"

and Rule 23

Utah State Juvenile Court Rules of Practice and Procedure
which provides:
time during, or at the conto t e c i
i sue
action is in t e interest o Justice an t e welfare
of the child, and the Court shall dismiss any petition which has not been proven, (emphasis added).
The Court when entering its Order of Partial Dismissal had
heard all of the Petitioners' evidence relative to those
items dismissed with the exception of the testimony of the
natural father, Sheldon J. Izatt, Respondent herein.

Respond-

ent's presence had not been supoenaed by Petitioners prior
to the hearing on October 17th, 1975 nor had requests been
made of Respondent's counsel to have Respondent present at
that hearing.

It certainly was well within the discretion

of the Lower Court to draw a conclusion upon the evidence
that Petitioners had brought forth on October 17th, 1975
that the likelyhood of Petitioners being able to ellict
information from the natural father, your Respondent, to
prove the allegations contained within paragraph 1 (a)
through 1 (c) was not sufficiently great to require additional hearings at the expense of forcing the father, your
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Respondent, to present defense to allegations which were
unfounded.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERROR IN GRANTING RESPONDENT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS THE REMAINDER OF PETITIONERS' AMENDED
PETITION
As set forth in Point I above, 55-10-84 (U.C.A. 1953,
as amended), and Rule 23 Utah State Juvenile Court Rules
of Practice and Procedure, provides that the Court may dismiss a Petition at any stage of the proceedings.

The posi-

tion of Respondent is that the rule and the statute upon
which the rule was based is controlling in this matter as
the said rule and statute have exclusive application to the
Juvenile Court system and they would certainly supercede
Rule 41, U.R.C.P. as cited by attorney for Appellants.
The Court was well within its discretion as allowed
by 55-10-84 (U.C.A. 1953, as amended), and Rule 23 Utah
State Juvenile Court Rules of Practice and Procedure for
at the time of granting the Motion to Dismiss the Court had
heard testimony of Petitioners' expert, Dr. Cutler, regarding
the remaining allegations in the Petition concerning "condition" (Tr. 223-224), as well as the testimony of Helen
Marie Nelson, social services worker with the Division of
Family Services, (Tr. 198-208).

Petitioners in their Brief,

discuss at some length that they were denied the opportunity
to present the testimony of their expert witness, Dr. Victor
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B. Cline, regarding the alleged condition of threatened
castration; however, upon questioning by the Court, counsel
for Petitioners was not able to proffer any proof as to the
threatened castration other than that the child in question,
who was three (3) years old at the time, was shown a knife
by the examiner and was asked what it was for.

The child

then made a statement to the effect that it was for my
mommy to cut my thing off.

The dialogue between the Court

and counsel for Appellants in reference to that proffer is
as follows, (Tr. 193-194):
Judge Larson:

Let me ask you, is the statment of the
boy made to Dr. Kline, I presume, is
that the basis of your claim that this
statement was made?

Mr. Goodwill:

That's right.

Judge Larson:

Is there any claim

Mr. Goodwill:

And we would also like thecpportunity,
Your ---

Judge Larson:

Is there any claim that it was made on
more than one occasion?

Mr. Goodwill:

No. We haven't finished our case,
Your Honor, and I'd also like the
opportunity ---

Judge Larson:

I understand that

Mr. Goodwill:

May I finish?

Judge Larson:

Just a ~inute, Mr. Goodwill. I was
asking you a question. If you were
permitted to put on your case are you
aoing to be able to show any more than
that in relation to this?

I'd like the opportunity
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Mr. Goodwill:

I don't know what the mother is going
to say. I've never had an opportunity
to put her on, but she is one of my
witnesses. She may admit it. She may
admit it on more than one occasion. I
think to bring this motion prematurely

Judge Larson:

Well, are you suggesting then that when
the case is tried you are going to call
her and then you'll find out what was
said? Why do we have to go to trial to
find that out?

In light of the report and testimony of the social
worker, Mrs. Nelson, the substance of which was that after
residing with his natural father for more than one (1) year,
the child was getting along very well,

and

in light of

the testimony of the witnesses of Petitioners already before the Court, it is the position of Respondent that the
Court was well within its discretion and was acting in the
best interest of the child in dismissing the Petition.

At

the time of the April 15th hearing, the child had been in
the home of his natural father for in excess of one (1)
year.

At the present time the child has been in the home

of his natural father in excess of two (2) years.

It was

the fear of the Court that the very continuation of the
proceeding could be detrimental to the child, (Tr. 196),
and the Court was acting in the child's best interests, as
allowed by 55-10-84 (U.C.A. 1953, as amended), and Rule 23
Utah State Juvenile Court Rules of Practice and Procedure
when he dismissed the Amended Petition.

The Court in making

its ruling stated:
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Judge Larson:

Anything further from anyone? As the
court looks at this, this has gone on
quite a long while. Course the court
does not approve any statements that
may have been made to this child threa~
ening castration, it seems to me that
the matter that has to be looked at
here is if this were to be proven, that
a trial of this case, what would be the
projected harm? Now we do have Dr.
Cutler's report in evidence. I think
that the best Dr. Cutler could do is
say yes this is harmful. This has
been threatened to a lot of people and
it may have been harmful to some and
not harmful to others. I think that
looking at it in the light most favorable to the petitioners, the most it
would be a matter of conjecture as to
what harm this would do the child. And
then, of course, if it was considered
to get harmful whether it was sufficient
harmful on which to base the jurisdiction of the court. It seems to me like
we're working with a pretty obscure
kind of comment that was made by a young
boy to a psychologist. I don't know
how you call the boy to the witness
stand, probably call him to the witness
would be more harmful than any statement
that may have been made to him, in fact.
Now there has been quite a bit made of
the question of the divurgence of mental
abilities here between members of this
presently constituted family. Court has
just about every day dealt with families
where there was a divurgence of mental
ability. There is a case on appeal in
this court right now where the mother had
an extremely low IQ, much lower than anything considered here, almost to the
state of her being a vegetable. I felt
in that case that the ability of the
mother was a condition upon which the
mother should be deprived of custody. I
think it was a cruel act that the court
was aksed to perform. I've no idea whether
the Supreme Court will sustain me or not,
but my point is that even in that kind of

-15-
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situation, as far as I was concerned
it was very questionable. We had to
weigh a lot of equities, and of course
this case is not anywhere near that. So
I don't think there is anything there. '
Now, that leaves the question of the
father's hostility. I've read Dr. Cutler's
report on this and he does indicate that
the father does have some explosive
capabilities. Nothing in the report suggests that those explosive capabilities
would result in any harm to this child.
Now, I suppose if the stress situation
was such that this might be a result,
but here again we're just conjecturing.
The motion to dismiss is granted.
(Tr. 209-210).
POINT III
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FILED IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BY THE NATURAL FATHER, RESPONDENT HEREIN, AND THE ORDER
ISSUED UPON THE HEARING OF SAID WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS
NOT PART OF THIS ACTION AND HAS NO EFFECT UPON THE JUVENILE
COURT'S DISMISSAL OF THE PETITIONERS' AMENDED PETITION ON
FILE HEREIN.
As the Writ of Habeas Corpus issued in the Third Judicial District Court in and for the County of Salt Lake, State
of Utah, in the matter of Sheldon J. Izatt vs. Ina Hellstrom,
Civil No. 226267, on the 10th day of March,

197~

was not

and is not a part of the action filed by Petitioners in the
Juvenile Court and is not a matter of record in this proceeding,
Respondent objects to the attempt by Appellants to utilize
said action as a means of appeal from the Order dismissing
their Petition in the Juvenile Court.

Furthe~

the Writ of

Habeas Corpus action is now moot for the reason that the
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person against whom the Writ was directed, Ina Hellstrom,
(the Respondent therein) is now deceased and was deceased
prior to dismissal of Appellants' Amended Petition.
POINT IV
THE APPOINTMENT OF MR. JOHN SOLTIS ON APRIL 15th, 1976
AS GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR THE CHILD WAS NOT ERROR,
On April 15th, 1976 the matter did not come on for
trial as set forth in the Brief of Appellants but only for
the purpose of ruling on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss
the remainder of Appellants' Amended Petition.

This fact

was acknowledged by counsel for Appellants (Tr. page 197
linffi 29-32, page 198 lines 1-2);
Mr. Goodwill:

We were told that it was set for trial
today, Your Honor, and we were told
that that trial date was striken. The
only matter I couldn't speak with your
Honor I asked and I was told that I
would not be able to and I was told
that it was striken from the trial
calendar and that the only motion would
be Mr. Schwobe's motion to dismiss.

At the time of April 15th, 1976, Mr. Stead who had been previously appointed attorney and guardian ad litem for the child
had left his employment with the County Attorney's office
and his work load had been taken over by John Soltis.

Over

the objection of Petitioners the Court appointed Mr. John
Soltis guardian ad litem for the child (Tr. 182).

Petiticrers

argue this appointment to be reversible error on the grounds
that Mr. Soltis was appointed without notice to Petitioners

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-17-

that he had apparently had conversation with Attorney for
Respondent prior to the hearing, and lastly that he was not
sufficiently familiar with the facts of this case to join
in Respondent's Motion to Dismiss.

As set forth in Appel-

lants' Brief 55-10-96 U.C.A. (1953, as amended), provides:
The Court may appoint counsel without such request
if it deems representation is necessary to protect
the child.
Apparently the Court did not feel that it was necessary
to appoint Mr. Soltis as the attorney for the child but it
did feel it necessary to appoint him as guardian ad litem.
Rule 33 Utah State Juvenile Court Rules of Practice and
Procedure aforementioned, which Rule is based upon the
55-10-96 u.c.A. (1953, as amended), provides in part:
••• if the interest of the child and those of the
party appear to conflict, or if neither parent is
available, or if counsel is necessary to meet the
requirements of a fair hearing, the Court shall
a oint a uardian ad litem or counsel or both to
protect t e interests o t e c i
ed)
It would appear under the statute and the Rule that the
appointment of a guardian ad litem or counsel or both is
fully within the discretion of the Court and there is not
requirement that the Court give notice of its intention to
appoint the same or hold a special hearing in that regard.
It is true that in this case counsel for Respondent
had in fact discovered that Mr. Soltis was replacing Mr.
Stead in the County Attorney's office, and had further, spoken
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with
miss.

hi~

concerning his feelings toward the Motion to Dis-

Said discovery and contact took place only as the

result of counsel for Respondent's preparation for his
Motion to Dismiss and it must be assumed that had Appellants
or Appellants' counsel checked with the County Attorney's
office to determine the position of the appointed representative of the child prior to the Motion, Appellants would have
been apprised of the same information as was counsel for the
Respondent.
It is apparent from the record that Mr. Soltis had
in fact prepared himself prior to the April 15th, 1976, hearing
in light of his informal replacement of Mr. Stead and anticipating that he would be appointed to represent the child's
interest in some manner at the April 15th hearing.

Appel-

lants in Point III of their argument contend that by virtue
of Mr. Soltis' limited contact with the case on April 15th,
1976 he was in no position to protect the best interests of
the child.

While Appellants would seek to hold out in their

Brief that as of the April 15th hearing the Amended Petition
retained an allegation that the father had abused the child,
this Honorable Court should note that such allegation had
been dismissed pursuant to the Court's Order of December 1st,
1975.

Therefore, it would appear from Mr. Soltis' statement

on page 190-191 of the transcript that he was familiar with

-19-
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the case and had in fact spent a substantial amount of time
preparing for and familiarizing himself with the Motion
coming before the Court on April 15th, 1976.

It must be

remembered that Mr. Soltis' participation in the case was
at the instance of an Order of the Juvenile Court and that
the burden was not upon Mr. Soltis to act as the trier of
fact with regard to Appellants' Petition, but his

state~ent

was simply part of the information taken into consideration
by the Court in dismissing the Petition.

Mr. Soltis stated,

(Tr. 190-191):
I would like to comment Your Honor. Referring to
the statute 55-10-99 that Mr. Schwobe made reference
to, permanent deprivation is laid out in petitioners
petition those to conduct or condition, not to be
repetitive but that the parent or parents are unfit
or incompetent by reason of conduct or condition
seriously detrimental to the child. I have personally met with the child, with Marie Nelson, for a
period of about an hour, I talked to the child and
tried to become friends and tried to gather as much
information from the child as I coud, based on his
age in the company of Miss Nelson, so I do have an
opinion as to the care of the child and the present
condition of the child. And I have been apprised by
Miss Nelson that the child has been with the parents
for a considerable period of time also. Leaving that
separate and apart and directing our attention to
the petition itself, the conduct that is alleged, I
was not at the other hearings, this is true and I
know nothing of the threats of the mother, if they
were made. The conduct as alleged as to the castration threats to the boy seem to be the only basis
of conduct that the petitioner is seeking to establish for permanent deprivation. In the alternative,
to together with this stating a condition, I have
never interviewed the father. This term toward massive hostility and the petition does not state that
this hostility, if it does exist, has been directed
toward the child by any specifics. More particularly
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though, with B and C, I am concerned that a criteria
of intelligence could be a basis for depriving people
of a child, based on a probability that the child
will not develop to his potential. I'm concerned
that a man's level of intelligence could do that to
him, could take his child from him. Coupling that
with Miss Nelson's opinion, and my observations of
the child, that his staying there, he has not been
emotionally deprived or intellectually deprived. So
I feel that intelligence could not be a condition
that could be a basis for taking a child away from
his natural parents, and I join Mr. Schwabe in his
motion concerning the intellectual factors being a
basis for taking a child away. In my capacity I
have not, I must say, been with the parents, but I
have questions concerning the substance alleged as
condition or conduct as also being the basis for
termination, and would join with them.
C 0 NC L U S I 0 N
The Order of Partial Dismissal and the Order dismissing
the remainder of Petitioners' Amended Petition was fully
within the discretion of the Juvenile Court as authorized
by Section 55-10-84, U.C.A. (1953, as amended), and Rule 23
Utah State Juvenile Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
Further, the Order of Partial Dismissal should be affirmed
for the reason that no timely appeal was taken therefrom. The
dismissal of Appellants' Amended Petition, which had been
brought and prosecuted under the Juvenile Court Act, had
no effect on the Habeas Corpus proceeding in the District
Court and further the Habeas Corpus became moot upon the
28th day of March, 1975, when the person against whom the
Writ was directed, Ina Hellstrom, the maternal grandmother of
the

chil~

passed away.
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Appellants' objection to the appointment of Mr.
Soltis as Guardian Ad Litem is not well taken for the reason that such appointment was also within the discretion of
the Juvenile Court.
On the 1st day of April, 1975, the Respondent, Sheldon
J. Izatt, did receive temporary custody of his son, a son
to which he had every legal right except for the untrue

a~

legations made against him by Petitioners and Ina Hellstrom
in their original Petition filed with the Juvenile Court.
His son has resided with him continuously since that day.
The legislature in recognizing the expertise of the
Juvenile Court system granted that Court great discretion
in its ability to dismiss, at any stage of the proceeding,
petitions which may be filed with it.

In this case, the

Juvenile Court properly excerised that discretion by dismissing the Amended Petition and thereby affirming the
natural father's legal right to custody of his son.
Respondent would respectfully urge that this Honorable
Court affirm the partial and final orders of dismissal as
entered by the Juvenile Court and grant Respondent his costs
as allowed by law.
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